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Abstract—In this era of big data, of quantified self and of
smart cities, wireless sensor networks are meant to be used
every day, for all sort of applications. Made of tiny sensors,
they collect data and communicate through wireless technologies.
Because they may take part in sensitive or military applications,
security is an essential matter in such networks. Confidential-
ity and authenticity can be ensured by the use of dedicated
mechanisms. Focusing on availability, we propose here a new
practical approach to protect the network against denial of
service attacks thanks to the use of traffic monitoring agents
called cNodes. The approach uses a fair election process of cNodes
in accordance with classical criteria related to residual energies
and the presence of compromised nodes which may have greedy
or jamming behaviors. Results obtained from simulations show
that this method is effective both in terms of detection and of
energy conservation.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks; Reliability, availabil-
ity, and serviceability; Energy-aware systems
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a self-organizing and
multi-hop network consisting of low-cost and small wireless
devices (sensor nodes) that are disseminated over a geograph-
ical area for gathering data on some physical phenomena.
Delivery of sensory data for process and analysis to a base
station is based on a collaborative work of the nodes in a
multi-hop fashion.
WSNs may be deployed in hostile or inaccessible environ-
ments raising many challenges to ensure that sensors work
effectively and survive long enough to fulfil their assignments.
Actually, WSN nodes are battery powered and are often
required to operate for long periods. Once its battery is
exhausted, a node is out of service and network performance
is degraded. Wireless transmission and reception make sig-
nificant demands on available energy in addition to the need
to process data, sense the environment et cætera. Thus energy
efficiency is an important concern in protocol design for multi-
hop networks like WSNs and it has strong influence on the
design of protocols (to a lesser extent, required computational
capabilities and memory are also issues to consider, because
both are restricted for sensors that must embed cheap and low-
consuming hardware).
Therefore, communications in a WSN shall abide to strict
time-constrained rules, as specified by the protocol stack used
in the network (such as IEEE 802.15.4TM for instance [1]).
When correctly applied, the protocol for the medium access
control (MAC) sublayer reduces collisions and improves the
transmission rate. However, its correct operating mode is based
upon a distributed algorithm that is executed locally on each
node to determine the periods of access to the channel. In
other terms, it is assumed that all WSN components will abide
to the given specifications. Unfortunately, such networks may
be implemented in untrusted environments where misbehaving
parties can deviate from the protocol specification and achieve
better performances at the expense of honest participants, or
use jamming techniques which prevent legitimate peers to
achieve their communications. Denial of service (DoS) attacks
precisely use such changes in these protocol parameters and in
the operating mode of some nodes, thereby leading to harmful
effects on the overall network performance.
In a previous work [2] an approach to deal with such risks
was given. It relies on the use of monitoring nodes (called
“cNodes”) to protect a clustered wireless sensor network
against various denial of service attacks. Clustering algorithms
are commonly used in an attempt to ease deployment and
managing and to better scale wireless sensor networks. They
create partitions (clusters) inside the network (see example on
Figure 1), each having a cluster head acting as a proxy between
the other nodes inside the cluster and the rest of the network.
cNodes are responsible for listening to the traffic around them
and for signaling misbehaving nodes to their cluster heads.
They have to remain in listening state all the time they endorse
this role. Hence the way they are selected among the nodes
can be decisive in regard to detection efficiency as well as
load repartition inside clusters. So as to improve this load
Figure 1. Scheme of an example clustered wireless sensor network
balancing, retained selection process of those control nodes is
based on the residual energies of sensors. But as compromised
nodes can make false statements about their residual energies,
they can easily become cNodes, thereby decreasing the odds
of being detected. This issue was addressed by introducing
a second role of surveillance (“vNodes”) responsible for
watching over the cNodes and for matching their announced
consumption according to a mathematical model.
However, such a proposal raises a recurrent problem since
such vNodes themselves have to be selected by the cluster
heads according to some criteria that can be faked by com-
promised nodes. Obviously, it seems inefficient to introduce
again a new kind of control role over vNodes and to continue
with the same problem over and over.
Therefore, we propose in this article a new efficient ap-
proach based on a fair election principle. Its purpose is to
provide a secure way to designate cNodes (i.e. to prevent
compromised nodes to be selected) while consuming as little
energy as possible, and to efficiently balance the load between
all nodes of the cluster. Our approach uses an iterative process
to always select one kind of control nodes which report to
their cluster heads the communications undertaken by their
neighboring sensors. In order to detect suspicious and compro-
mised nodes, the cluster heads compute the consumed energy
of each node from declared residual energies and then compare
it with that assessed according to reported communications
from its related cNodes. Furthermore, in the first iteration of
the process, all nodes are considered as cNodes and used for
controlling each other in order to eliminate suspicious nodes
as much as possible. Each cNode is selected henceforth among
sane nodes in such a way that each node is controlled by at
least two cNodes. During next iterations, cNodes act as control
nodes monitoring surrounding simple sensors as well as other
neighboring cNodes (in other words they also endorse the role
of vNodes from formerly proposed approach), thus increasing
the likelihood to detect suspicious nodes even though they
were selected before as cNodes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents some related work about discussed topics. We
expose our model in Section III, and then the simulation results
obtained with the ns-2 tool in Section IV. At last Section V
sums up our contribution and brings perspectives for future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section is divided into three parts: security in wireless
sensor networks, denial of service specific mechanisms, and
clustering algorithms and energy preservation.
A. Security in WSNs
Denial of service is not the only type of attacks a WSN
should resist to. Security in general in sensor networks has
attracted quite a lot of interest during the last years. Hence it
has been the subject of many studies in literature, as well as
several state-of-the-art articles [3], [4].
Confidentiality and integrity must be ensured to prevent
attackers to access to, or to tamper sensitive data. A number
of solutions have been proposed [5], many of them involving
strong [6] and/or homomorphic [7] cryptography, some relying
on other mechanisms such as multi-path based fragmentation
of the packets [8] or game theory [9].
Authentication brings to participants the guarantee that the
peer they are communicating with truly is what it claims to be;
that is another important point. It has been deeply investigated
as well [10]. Many lightweight proposals for key management
in WSNs have been suggested [11], [12].
Apart from those, there have been a variety of proposals to
secure some other elements, considering that any information
about any aspect of the network might be valuable to an
attacker. Hence there are approaches, for instance, to secure
the geographical location of the nodes through epidemical
information dissemination [13] as well as through more con-
ventional mechanisms [14].
B. DoS-specific mechanisms
Denial of service attacks embraces many different attacks,
which can target all layers of the network [15]. Jamming the
radio frequencies as well as disturbing the routing protocols
are just a few examples of ways to degrade the network. In re-
action to these, a number of solutions have been proposed [16].
As stated in the introduction, we focus in this paper on
inside attackers attempting to bend the MAC protocol pa-
rameters to their needs, be it to achieve better performances
for themselves (greedy attacks) or to generally harm the
network (jamming attacks or sleep deprivation). To detect such
attackers, many solutions rely on trust models [17]. We base
our own work on Lai’s and Chen’s approach [18], which
consists in assigning monitoring nodes in the network. Those
monitoring nodes, also called cNodes in this article, apply a set
of rules [19] to overheard traffic so as to detect misbehaving
nodes. On multiple rule breaks, they report the suspicious node
to the cluster head. To prevent false positive detection, the CH
waits for several reports about a given node before considering
it as compromised. After that, it virtually excludes the misbe-
having node from the cluster by broadcasting a warning to all
sensors. We have observed in previous studies that renewing
periodically the selection process of those monitoring nodes
(cNodes) helps saving energy in the network [20], and we
have tried ever since to find an optimal selection algorithm to
obtain a good equilibrium between security, attack detection
and energy preservation [21].
C. Clustering algorithms and energy preservation
A lot of approaches intended to bring security in a WSN are
cluster-based [22]. But the main purpose of clustering a sensor
network usually resides in scaling possibilities, improved
nodes management and energy savings brought by partition-
ing. Several clustering algorithms have been proposed [23].
They generally aim at determining which nodes in the network
will be the cluster heads, often basing the choice on energetic
considerations. Basically, choosing a cluster head in a network
is not so different than selecting cNodes in a cluster. But in the
latter case we have some additional constraints on security.
One of the easiest clustering algorithm to implement, and
probably one of the most used is the LEACH algorithm [24].
LEACH makes each node draw a pseudo-random number and
matches it with a threshold which was computed from the
number of desired cluster heads in the network and from the
last iteration when the sensor was selected as a CH. There is a
number of proposals derived from LEACH, to improve either
its efficiency [25], [26] or its security [27]. Other example
clustering algorithms include HEED [28] or FFUCA [29].
Aside from clustering, the importance of energetic issues
in WSNs have led to the proposals of several mechanisms to
cut down its consumption [30], based for example on packets
priority [31].
III. PROCEDURE OF FAIR ELECTION OF CNODES
Our selection process of cNodes is iterative so that new cN-
odes are continually elected and others are discarded because
they have already taken this role before or have been declared
as suspicious.
Let the symbol N denote the set of all nodes in the cluster
and CN denote the set of cNodes. i is the index ranging
over N . Let REk be an array of residual energies of nodes
reported by cNodes to the cluster head at the kth iteration.
The symbol Obsk[j] denotes an array containing observations
made by cNode j on communications of its neighbors.
The election process starts with an initialization phase and
then enters a loop block which is iteratively performed as long
as the network is running.
A. Initialization phase
At the start of the process, the following actions are under-
taken:
• Each node i of the cluster sends to the cluster head the
value of its residual energy, which is stored into a related
array RE0[i].
• Each node acts as a cNode and starts controlling its neigh-
bors. It keeps sensing and forwarding data (otherwise
there would be no traffic to observe). Since the set of
cNodes contains all nodes of the cluster, each node starts
recording the packets sent by its neighbors.
• The cluster head sets the counter of iterations k to 1.
B. Loop block
At each iteration k, the election process executes the fol-
lowing steps:
1) The duration of this surveillance step at any iteration k
is random to prevent compromised nodes to simulate
the behavior of sane nodes as long as possible. During
step 1, each cNode controls the neighboring nodes
(including other cNodes) by recording and adding up
sizes of all packets sent or received by these nodes.
2) At the end of iteration k, the cluster head (CH) asks each
node i to send its residual energy value REk[i] and asks
each cNode j to send the array Obsk[j] containing its
observations over transmission rates of its neighbors.
3) For each node i, the cluster head performs an analysis
work as follows:
• According to an adequate mathematical model, the
CH assesses the energy consumption ECa related to
the maximum of rates {Obsk[j][i]}|j∈CN observed
by neighboring cNodes j during the current iteration
k.
• The CH also computes the value of the energy con-
sumption ECd as the difference between residual
energies declared in the two last steps (i.e. REk[i]
and REk−1[i]).
• If |ECd−ECa| ≤  (where  represents a tolerated
error) then the node i is declared as sane and put
into the set SEN of nodes eligible to take on a
cNode functioning mode. Otherwise, it is removed
from the set SEN of sane nodes (if it was there)
and put into the pool SSN of suspicious nodes.
• Let SSN [i] stand for the number of times it has
declared as suspicious from the start of the process.
If SSN [i] ≥ threshold then the node is declared
as compromised and put into a quarantine list. On
the other hand, if a suspicious node has continually
been declared as sane (more than some number of
times) then it could be removed from SSN and put
again into SEN .
4) Once step 3 is finished, the CH selects cNodes from the
set SEN of eligible nodes in such a way that every node
is controlled by at least two cNodes. Hence, as a cNode
will be controlled by other cNodes, its misbehavior
would be reported to the CH. For further iterations,
such a rule helps detect and discard compromised nodes
which have been chosen as cNode because they normally
behaved in the past iterations and made false statement
about their residual energies, unless they continue to
undertake normal communications.
5) The process increments the number k of iterations and
continues its iterative execution by going back to step 1.
C. Mathematical model for energy consumption
A possible mathematical model that the cluster heads may
use for computing the energy consumed by the nodes based on
received observations is Rakhmatov and Vrudhula’s diffusion
model [32]. It provides a pretty accurate approximation of
real consumption, taking into account chemical processes
internal to the battery such as rate capacity effect and recovery
effect. Rakhmatov and Vrudhula’s diffusion model refers to
the chemical reaction happening inside the battery electrolyte,
and is summarized by equation (1):
σ(t) =
∫ t
0
i(τ) dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
l(t)
+
u(t)︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ t
0
i(τ)
(
2
∞∑
m=1
exp−β
2m2(t−r)
)
dτ
(1)
where:
• σ(t) is the apparent charge lost from the battery at t.
• l(t) is the charge lost to the load (“useful” charge).
• u(t) is the unavailable charge (“lost in battery” charge).
• i(t) is the current at t.
• β =
pi
√
D
w
, where D is the diffusion constant and w the
full width of the electrolyte of the battery.
In practice, computing the first ten terms of the sum provides
a good approximation.
D. Selecting cNodes among set SEN
At step 3 of the fair election process, cluster heads select
the cNodes for the running iteration among the nodes inside
SEN sets. Note that any selection criterion could be used
at this point. For instance, cNodes could be randomly picked
among elements of SEN until we have:
• enough cNodes (according to user’s choice)
• and all nodes covered by at least two cNodes, as men-
tioned above.
Some other selection criteria could include:
• residual energy of the nodes
• connectivity index (number of direct neighbors)
• signal power
• et cætera
Several criteria can even be combined to obtain a weighted
score, such as for instance in equation 2:
sk[i] = (α×REk[i])+(γ×cik[i])+(δ×spk[i])+(ζ×nslk[i])
(2)
where:
• sk[i] denotes the score for node i at iteration k.
• REk[i] remains the residual energy for said node and
iteration.
• cik[i] would be the connectivity index of i.
• spk[i] is the average signal power as perceived by the
neighbors of node i.
• nslk[i] is the maximum value between a predetermined
integer value and the number of iterations before k since
node i was last selected as a cNode.
• α, γ, δ and ζ would be constants fixed by the user.
This formula could be used to sort nodes in set SEN so that
the cluster head can select the best possible cNodes in regard
to retained criteria.
Setting the criteria and the weights for the formula is up
to the user of the network. It should be adapted to the exact
application and environment of the WSN. For instance it may
be worth noting that for networks made of static nodes, the
connectivity index and the signal power of the nodes are not
expected to change much between two consecutive iterations.
Therefore their weights should not be too high (in regard to
the other weights in the formula) so as to avoid selecting the
same cNodes at each iteration. In clustered networks, where
all the nodes can reach their CH in a one-hop fashion, index
connectivity or signal power might not even be relevant (once
again, depending also on the deployed application). But even
if we only work in clustered networks in this study — because
they allow energy savings and a much better scaling — we
should nevertheless consider other architectures in that respect,
for not all WSNs are clustered. And many ones also work with
mobile nodes. In such cases, evaluating the density of nodes or
the quality of the links in the area where the candidate cNodes
are located becomes more interesting because it generally has
a higher impact on performances. Such observations remain
valid for the chosen constraint stating that each node must
be watched over by at least two cNodes. While it is a good
thing in clusters where nodes are all gathered around their
cluster head, it could be much harder to obtain in some other
topologies. In a star-like network for instance, where most
sensors would be on branches and only have two neighbors
(one closer, one farther from the base station), it could result
in all nodes being selected as cNodes.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
So as to compare our proposal with previous approaches,
we have undertaken simulations using ns-2 software with
parameters displayed in Table I. A star (*) denotes a value
used only for compromised node. To play their role during
the whole duration of the simulation, the compromised node
as well as the cluster head were granted more energy than
the normal sensors. The simulated cluster is a grid with ten
sensors on each side, and the transmission range is such that
the nodes in the corner can just reach until the cluster head, as
displayed on Figure 2. We compared the fair election process
with a (pseudo-)random selection such as in [20].
Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Simulation time 3,600 seconds
Initialization phase 30 seconds
Number of sensors 100 (+ cluster head)
Topology regular grid (72m×72m)
Compromised node(s) number 1
cNodes percentage 7 to 10 %
Transmission rate 1 kbits/s — 35 kbits/s*
Transmission range 50 meters
Packets size 500 bytes
Reception consumption 0.395 W
Emission consumption 0.660 W
Initial energy amount 10 J — ∞*
A. Detection rate
The number of cNodes which detected the compromised
node at each iteration are reported on Figure 3. After
2,000 seconds, nearly all nodes in the cluster are dead. Before
that, we can observe that the efficiency of the two methods,
with 10 % of cNodes, is nearly the same. The random selection
process can afford monitoring a little longer but with a lower
detection rate; the fair election process ensures that all nodes
are monitored by at least two cNodes, therefore the number of
Figure 2. Topology of simulated cluster; transmission range is (a
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Figure 3. Denial of service attack detection
cNodes detecting the compromised node takes longer to drop
under 2.
We tried to see what results would give another instance of
the fair election process, but with only seven cNodes. In this
case the average detection rate is slightly lower (since we have
less cNodes), but the detection is still performed by at least one
cNode after 2,200 seconds. With the random selection process,
the use of seven cNodes only drops significantly the efficiency
of the detection method. It was not displayed on the graph.
B. Energy
Figure 4 presents the time of death of the normal sensors
in the cluster. As expected, the fair election process leads
to a faster exhaustion of the battery. This is due in part to
the initialization phase, when all nodes remain in a listening
state all along; and also to the emission of the observations of
the nodes to the cluster head at each iteration. The difference
between the two methods is quite low: the initialization phase
plays for most of it, and it would be softened over time with
real batteries (remember that we worked with 10 J only).
The test involving seven cNodes gives better results than
both methods using ten monitoring nodes. We can observe
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Figure 4. Time of death of the nodes
an early drop due to the increased consumption of the initial
phase, but after 1,300 seconds there are more nodes alive
than with the random selection process used to pick ten
cNodes. The fewer cNodes the cluster have, the less indeed
they consume energy.
C. Compromised cNodes
Using only seven nodes with the fair election process seems
to be a good approach. The detection rate remains correct,
while the energy consumption is lower than other methods
using more monitoring nodes. But with fewer cNodes there
is a risk that compromised nodes manage to monopolize the
roles, and that nothing remains to detect them.
The observations submitted to the cluster head and the
constraint we used to enforce that each node be monitored
by at least two cNodes are useful here. With a random
selection process (i.e. without applying those constraints) we
had the compromised node elected as a cNode during 12 %
of the simulation time on average (it is a little more than the
theoretical 10 % expected with 10 % of cNodes in the cluster).
The fair election process and its additional constraint were
enough, within the conditions of our simulations, to prevent
completely the compromised node to be selected as a cNode
at any time.
V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
Monitoring nodes (cNodes) can be used in WSNs so as
to detect compromised nodes and to virtually exclude them.
This role consumes more energy than normal sensing, and
for obvious security reasons it must not be assigned to rogue
sensors. In this article we proposed a novel approach to select
those cNodes based on an iterative fair election principle
for clustered wireless sensor networks. After an initialization
phase and for each cluster, the cluster head establishes a list
of eligible nodes from the observations of the sensors relative
to their neighbors, and then selects the cNodes using the best
suited criteria for the application run in the network.
Experiments performed through the ns-2 simulator show
that even if global consumption is slightly higher than for
a selection process based on randomness, the detection rate
is good, and the method can even afford to use less cNodes
without loosing in efficiency. In addition to this, the risk of
selecting a compromised node as cNode is drastically reduced.
Based on this work, we would like to push our experiments
in further study so as to analyze the impact of our solution on
networks with different topologies (for instance, non-clustered
networks or networks with areas of different activity levels),
and to observe the consequences of the different parameters
used by the cluster head to proceed to the selection itself.
Additional perspectives include improving the security of
this approach by monitoring the cluster head, as well as
formal modeling of the solution and validation through model-
checking tools.
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